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Housing Policy and the Changing Tenure Mix 
 
Introduction 
Housing is once again rising up the political agenda. The Ipsos Mori  Issues Index in March 
this year suggested it is now the fourth most important issue facing Britain - its highest 
position since 1974 and massively higher than in 2010 (Ipsos Mori, 2018). This concern  is 
reflected particularly in government policy to ensure a massive increase in new house 
building; but also to provide more social housing; to improve access to owner-occupation; 
and more generally to help younger people find affordable homes. In other words housing 
policy is expected to solve the housing problem by a range of interventions involving 
planning,   modifying the construction process, taxation and specific initiatives to support 
consumers and providers.  
Yet this avoids the question as to whether housing policy is actually capable of addressing 
these issues - given the economic and political environment and, in particular, the accretion 
of existing policies in which it has to function.  In this paper we look at some of these 
questions - looking first, at who actually determines policy and then at three examples - of 
the limitations of policy intervention in the face of market pressures, notably in the context 
of taxation; of its inconsistency with respect to the messages it sends to stakeholders; and 
the impact of particular initiatives to expand new supply and support owner-occupation. 
A starting point is the Government’s 2017 Green Paper ‘Fixing Our Broken Housing Market’ 
(DCLG, 2017) the title of which in itself raises three issues: is it broken; how is it broken; and 
will the emphasis on new build actually fix it.  First, it is almost certainly still the case that 
the vast majority of households are happy with their housing conditions - although the 
question is no longer asked on a regular basis.  Importantly the Ipsos Mori survey shows that 
concerns are very much stronger in London and to a somewhat lesser degree in the South 
than in the Midlands and the North.  This suggests that the concerns in many parts of the 
country are more related to affordability and access than to new build as such. Moreover 
the econometric evidence shows that any levels of new build that are within the range of 
possibilities will have relatively little direct impact on house prices and affordability - hardly 
surprising seeing that new additions have  accounted for less than 1%  of the total stock for 
decades.   
 
 
Who Makes Housing Policy? 
 
One big issue for housing policy is who is in charge? Housing policy is technically the remit of the 
Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government. But  any policy that involves taxation or 
subsidy needs at least the agreement of the Treasury - and indeed is often led by them as for 
instance is the case with respect to Help to Buy  which was first announced in the 2013 Budget by 
George Osborn.  Equally any policy which involves lending or interest rates  is part of the  monetary 
policy remit of Bank of England – so access to mortgage finance for instance is significantly 
determined by their views on overall  financial stability with regulations implemented through the 
Prudential Regulation authority and the Financial Conduct Authority.  The National Infrastructure 
and Projects Authority is a non-Ministerial Department set up in 2016 is as its name implies in charge 
of major initiatives many of which involve large scale housing development. The Department of 
Work and Pensions plays a key role in housing affordability through the housing benefit system as 
well as by exercising significant control over rent setting in the social sector. Other spending 
Departments, such as the Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, also impact 
directly on the ministry’s capacity to implement housing policy.  Given this range of interests it is 
hardly surprising that policy can seem incoherent and indeed inconsistent.  It is also one reason why 
the White Paper concentrates so heavily on new build (which is firmly within their remit) but says 
little about the many other factors which help determine whether the housing market functions 
effectively. 
The problems are made worse by the accretion of housing policies that has occurred over the years.  
The Housing Policy Review published in 1977 (Dept of Environment, 1977) had the remit to attempt 
to simplify the system. It failed and was all but swept away by the IMF crisis of 1976 when housing 
had to accept significant cutbacks. Since then there has been regular attempts at making the system 
more coherent, but these are often impeded by other Departments’ priorities as well as by the need 
to be seen to be doing something.  
Perhaps most importantly, more general economic and social/cultural factors may actually be 
stronger than any policy initiative - so policy makers are often in the position of fire-fighting 
especially when there is a financial crisis or being behind the curve when new and unexpected 
trends appear unexpectedly. 
Here I concentrate on three examples. The first looks at how market factor have dominated; the 
second how other priorities can generate further policy incoherence; and the third how specific 
policies may generate different outcomes from those expected at the inception of the policy. 
Example 1: the growth of the private rented sector since the turn of the century. 
In 1961 some 30% of all dwellings in England were privately rented. Over the next thirty years the 
proportion declined to just under 9% of all dwellings with the sector being seen as playing a residual 
role for those with accommodation related to employment, some younger and more mobile 
households and those who could not enter either owner-occupation (Bovaird et al, 1985; Whitehead 
and Kleinman, 1986). Importantly many economists saw private renting as an inferior good – with 
both owner-occupation and social housing offering much better value for individual households – to 
the point where many commentators thought it would almost disappear. 
Yet, as it obvious from Figure 1, in fact the proportion of dwellings that are rented privately started 
to rise from 1991 first quite slowly but more rapidly after the introduction of the Buy to Let 
mortgage in the late 1990s.  In 2003 when data were revised in the light of the census, private 
renting accounted for 11.8% of the total stock. Thereafter the private rented sector stock increased 
from a little over 2.5m to 4.8m  - and thus from around 12% to almost exactly 20% by 31st March 
2017. 
How did this process occur – especially given that almost no new housing has been built directly for 
private renting?  Between March 2003 and March 2017 more than 1.35m units were completed in 
the private sector – mostly for owner-occupation. Over the same period, the total number of owner-
occupied dwellings increased but by only just over 300,000 (resulting in a reduction in the 
percentage of the total stock which was owner-occupied from 69% to 63%).   In the social sector 
330,000 units were built, but the stock declined by 110,000 (20% reduced to 17%).  Thus basically 
while new build was concentrated in the majority sectors the dynamics were basically that they 
were building for the private rented sector!  
Figure 1: Dwellings by tenure: England  
 
Source: MHCLG live tables 
Importantly similar patterns were observed across the country as well as in Wales and Scotland – all 
that has differed is the starting proportion. In particular it is NOT just a London phenomenon – there 
was of course more to start with but the rate of increase has been fairly similar (Whitehead et al, 
2018).  
Importantly the rapid growth in the private rented sector was hardly noticed by government policy 
let alone predicted by policy makers. The major Green Papers of 2000 and 2007 (DETR, 2000; DCLG, 
2007 did not really mention the PRS.  The Department did provide broad terms of reference for an 
an independent review in 2008 (Rugg and Rhodes, 2008) some of which was taken forward in the 
2011 Housing Strategy  (HM Government, 2011 – note not CLG). Thereafter, the Department set up 
a review chaired by Sir Adrian Montague (Montague, 2012 which recommended a private rented 
sector taskforce concentrating mainly on brining institutional investment into the sector.  Thereafter 
this has led to polices around both subsidy and guarantees and the development of a Build to Rent 
model which is only now beginning to add significantly to the housing stock (British Property 
Federation, 2017). Overall, therefore positive policies have come very late to the party. 
However the growth of the private rented sector has been in part an unintended consequence of 
other policies, including:  
• The Right to Buy has transferred almost 2 million dwellings into the owner-occupied sector 
private rented sector since 1980. But over the years many of these dwellings, especially 
those located in poorer quality accessible areas, have been transferred into the private 
rented sector.  Current suggestions are that around 40% of right to Buy homes now being 
privately rented; 
• Reductions in the availability of social rented housing have led to increasing numbers of 
lower income households becoming private tenants. This in turn has led to a massive 
increase in the housing benefit bill. Indeed while the proportion of private tenants in receipt 
of housing benefit has been relatively stable at 20% of all private tenants. However this 
implies a very large increase in the numbers claiming benefit to the point where the sector 
accounts for about 40% of the £24bn budget; 
• Regulatory changes together with relative stagnation in incomes and insure jobs among 
younger households has meant that many potential owner-occupiers are being excluded 
from the sector even though they could well afford to buy.  
• In this context the median first time buyer is paying around 17% of income in capital and 
interest payments. The equivalent figures for private tenants are between 35% and 40% 
depending on whether housing benefit is treated as income.  This gap is indicative that many 
households are being excluded from entering owner-occupation putting further pressure on 
the private rented sector. 
• Importantly regulatory requirements include a stress test on monthly payments which 
means that potential mortgagors must show that they can cover at the time of purchase a 
3% increase in interest rates - way outside any macro-prediction of interest rates by either 
the Bank of England or other central banks. Together with uncertainties in the job market 
and the costs of private renting while people try to save up for the large deposits required 
because of the relative lack of high loan to value ratio mortgages mean that large numbers 
of those who could afford to pay for owner-occupation are excluded (Whitehead and 
Williams, 2017). 
• The impact of the government’s quantitative easing policy, as in most other countries, has 
had a major effect on asset prices – which has fed through to house prices in part because of 
the lack of alternative investment opportunities for many households. 
• More fundamentally the Bank of England’s core role is to stabilise the overall financial 
system. If this means that housing suffers that is to a significant extent not something that 
they can worry about. 
 
Example 2:  Policy inconsistency: taxation and its impact on tenure choice 
This topic could fill many books but here we look briefly at two issues: the relative taxation position 
between tenures and the differential impact of stamp duty on private landlords.  
Originally owner-occupation was treated as an investment good, with taxation based on net income 
including mortgage tax relief and the taxation of imputed income. In the 1960s however the tax on 
imputed income was removed and capital gains tax was introduced but not for the primary home. 
On the other hand from 1969 there were increasing constraints on mortgage tax relief until it was 
finally abolished in 2000 – at which point owner-occupied housing became a consumption good for 
taxation purposes.  In addition there have been subsidies to enter owner-occupation including for 
instance shared ownership and rent to own both of which involve below market rents and currently 
Help to Buy – see below) 
Private renting on the other hand has historically been treated as an investment good with taxation 
based on net income. However, as compared to other countries there is no depreciation allowance 
as property is perceived by the taxation system to be a perpetual asset (see Whitehead et al 2016 for 
an assessment of relative taxation across four European countries) so it is reasonable to argue that 
private renting in the UK is particularly badly treated.  
This was the position until the Treasury decided that from April 2017 mortgage tax relief for 
individual landlords should be limited to the standard rate of tax phased in over four years.  At the 
same time allowances for wear and tear expenses for furnished lettings have been cut and there is a 
shift from net to gross rental income when determining the tax rate to be charged. This puts 
individual landlords at a considerable disadvantage as compared to company landlords as well as 
owner-occupiers. The policy change was rationalised on the grounds that Buy to Let landlords were 
outbidding potential owner-occupiers for property suitable for first time buyers and that the 
expansion of  Buy to Let mortgage debt could increase the risks of market volatility.  The result 
however is to produce an even more inherent taxation framework across tenures and indeed types 
of owner.  
A second major issue is the inefficiencies associated with stamp duty land tax (SDLT) – as well as 
again its differential impact on different owners.  Stamp duty is regarded as a bad tax by almost all 
economic commentators in that it reduces the incentive and capacity to move to more productive 
jobs and to adjust housing consumption to people’s changing circumstances (see eg the reports by 
Henry et al in 2010 for Australia and Mirrlees et al, also in 2010 for the UK). However it is now 
charged on some two thirds of all residential transactions and has been an increasingly important of 
tax revenue over the last decade as rates have risen, transactions have increased and house prices 
have risen.  In the financial year 2016 - 2017 SDLT, brought in some £9.3 bn from residential sales 
more than double the take in 2011/2012.  Over 50% of these receipts come from London and the 
South East where the costs of immobility are likely to be greatest.  
Importantly from the point of the impact on tenure choice and investment the government 
introduced an additional dwelling supplement of 3% on second homes and buy to let properties in 
April 2016. Some 46% of residential receipts in the first quarter of 2018 came from ‘additional’ 
dwellings with over 40% of that coming from the 3% surcharge.  
Finally in terms of tenure differentials from November 2017 first time buyers were given additional 
relief by which those buying properties at less than £300,000 pay no tax while those buying at under 
£500,000 only pay 5% on the portion over £300,000.   This again favours owner-occupation over 
other tenures. 
All these differentials distort the market and in particular reduce the individual landlord’s incentive 
to provide rented accommodation (Scanlon et al, 2016; Scanlon et al, 2017). More generally they 
give the impression that revenue raising is far more important than rationality – and all these 
changes are brought in by the Treasury who inherently have a wider range of objectives than simply 
ensure adequate provision.  
Example 3: direct assistance for new build and owner-occupation 
Direct assistance for housing is now almost entirely limited to supporting new building – in line with 
the government’s emphasis on increasing net new additions to 200,000 until 2020 and up to 250,000 
thereafter. The only exception is transfers at below market price from the social sector.    
The two biggest schemes are shared ownership and now Help to Buy. Shared ownership is a long 
running scheme introduced by local authorities in London and Birmingham in the 1970s (as the Half 
and Half scheme) and introduced by central government in 1980. It was and is a part purchase 
(initially usually 50%) part social rent model normally with the right to ‘staircase’ up to 100% 
ownership. It has filled a gap in the lower end of the market and has generally been much liked by 
purchasers. However there have been continuing problems with respect to the cost of mortgages 
and the security available to lenders; the capacity to re-sell in the market. It has involved relatively 
little direct subsidy notably because it counts as affordable housing in the context of S106. Perhaps 
the biggest issues have been on the supply side where housing associations in the run up to the 
financial crisis did not recognise the risks they were taking on. The current government has provided 
significant support for the scheme and there are now new entrants into the funding market. As such, 
despite some issues, it has been one of the more successful initiatives- long lasting; liked by 
consumers; undoubtedly a bit too complicated; and difficult to scale up. But by policy standards it is 
fine. 
Help to Buy was introduced in 2013 for 2 purposes: to support owner-occupation (not restricted to 
first time buyers) and to support new housing development. It has been heavily criticised for being a 
demand led product aiming at expanding supply. However perhaps this makes more sense than in 
other contexts because the speculative development model which dominates in the UK is itself 
demand led – so it plays to the market (Letwin, 2018). It was introduced in 2013 when the market 
was already slowly picking up – but developers were reaching the end of their capacity to provide 
funding for part equity products such as First Buy. The 2015 evaluation suggested that maybe 40% of 
those who purchased would not have been able to buy a new build product at the time of purchase 
leading to perhaps a 15% plus increase in new private completions (Finlay et al, 2016). On that basis 
there is clearly considerable deadweight loss and some upward pressure on new build prices 
(notably because the only government assistance available is now for new build). However it has 
done ‘what it said on the tin’ – expanded output considerably; helped purchasers to buy by reducing 
loan to value ratios and deposit requirements and notably increased confidence among both 
developers and purchasers.  The main issue at present is how to maintain these benefits while 
enabling the market to return to normal.  
Partial equity products have been favoured by the Bank of England for many years as a means of 
reducing and sharing risk. The Help to Buy product means that government bears a proportion of the 
risk especially in the early years but also can be expected to make a reasonable return as long as 
there is general inflation – even if real house prices return. One question for the future is whether 
such a model could become self-sustaining – gaining the risk sharing benefits at the same time 
reducing the distortionary impacts. 
Underlying this discussion of specific products is a more fundamental question of why support home 
ownership rather than rental which can at least in principle manage risks more effectively than 
owner-occupation. There are longer term benefits to government in that people should be able to 
pay for their own housing in older age as well as the simple fact that the majority of people want to 
be home owners once they are a settled family, location and job.  But fundamentally this is a 
political decision. 
Concluding comment  
Housing policy has always been a mess, partly because it is affected by some many different factors 
at the same time as being extremely important to everyone individual in society. The current 
emphasis on new build makes sense if investment can be significantly increased simply because it 
provides more housing.  However prices are determined in the whole market and affected in 
particular by the health of the economy as well as household income growth. New build will 
therefore have very little impact.   
In the last few years – and we are talking two or three- Build to Rent and Permitted Development 
have made significant impacts on the new build market. The first has been market led but supported 
by government; the second involves identifying development that does not require individual 
planning permission. Both, especially permitted development, have their costs and issues around 
how much they can effectively be scaled up. Policy could be tuned to address them more effectively. 
So despite the many concerns raised in this paper around how policy continues to develop there are 
some hopeful sign.  
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